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ontemporary epistemologists often borrow from act
and rule-based ethical models in building their theo
ries. The turn away from such models toward a virtue
approach by certain ethicists has therefore attracted
the attention of epistemologists as well. I argue in this paper that
a theory of belief formation centering on the concept of epistemic
virtue works only if it has a strong internalist component regard
ing matters of justification. First, I critique a type of externalist
reliabilism, Plantinga's theory of warrant, in order to illustrate
why internalist considerations ought to be made in developing
an epistemic theory regarding belief formation. Second, I demon
strate how Linda Zagzebski's epistemic virtue theory inherits
impoverished aspects of Plantingan r~liabilism, thereby helping
me to illustrate the necessity of the internalist-virtue integration
mentioned above. Third, I briefly outline one way in which
internalist, deontic concepts and the concept of epistemic virtue
may be integrated.
Before demonstrating why Plantinga's theory of warrant
is an insufficient account of belief formation, it is necessary to
summarily indicate the differences between internalism and ex
ternalism (particularly Plantinga's reliabilist theory of proper
fUl1ction), and most importantly, the distinction between internal
justification and Plantingan warrant. Internalists, like their deon
tological counterparts in ethics, are essentially concerned with
the permissibility of beliefs, or whether an agent is acting in
accordance with epistemic duty. In order for a belief to be justi
fied, the agent must have cognitive access to the grounds upon
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which the justification depends. The ability to determine whether
a belief is ·justified is within the believer's control. In contrast,
externalist theories typically require no such internal cognitive
access. The main concern of reliabilism, a popular form of exter
nalism, is to form as many true beliefs as possible, with the
reliability of the agent's cognitive mechanisms serving as the
primary condition for the belief to be true. The ideas of warrant,
a reliabilist requirement for true belief formation, and justifica
tion are not to be conflated. On the difference between Plantin
gan warrant and justification, John Zeis states:
As Plantinga's critique in the Warrant volumes
makes clear, one of the fundamental differences
between what he conceives of as warrant and
what he and most others conceive of as justifica
tion is that warrant is (almost exclusively) an ex
ternalist property of belief, whereas justification
has a strong internalist constraint. What does such
a difference entail? Most generally, I think it
entails a difference in the level of reflective consid
eration. A belief may be warranted in Plantinga's
sense, and there may be little or virtually no reflec
tive consideration of the belief. Such reflective
consideration of course would typically involve
the consideration of grounds, evidence, epistemic
duty-fulfillment and the like. (33)
The warrant of a belief depends upon factors that can be met
without, or independent of, cognitive control on the part of the
agent. On the other hand, the criteria for justification can be met
only if the believer is in a certain amount of cognitive control, or
as Zeis would suggest, engages in a sufficient "level of reflective
considera tion."

I.
At the heart of Plantinga's theory of epistemic warrant is
the notion of proper function. He grants that this stipulation in
itself is not sufficient for warrant, and goes on to outline other
necessary conditions for its entailment, namely that an agent is in
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an epistemically sound environment and that his cognitive facul
ties are working in accordance with their design plan:
We may say that a belief B has warrant for 5 if and
only if the relevant segments (the segments in
volved in the production of B) are functioning
properly in a cognitive environment sufficiently
similar to that for which 5' s faculties are designed;
and the modules of the design plan governing the
production of Bare (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such
that there is a high objective probability that a
belief formed in accordance with those modules
(in that sort of cognitive environment) is true; and
the more firmly 5 believes B the more warrant B
has for (Plantinga 19)
The production" of a true belief and the "high objective proba
bility" that this belief is true are major aspects of Plantinga's
requirements for warrant that are reminiscent of a consequential
ist model in ethics, utilitarianism. In a characteristically conse
quentialist manner, the proper means required to produce true
beliefs are not stipulated by the criteria Plantinga offers. Proper
function itself is not a means to the end of producirig true beliefs,
but rather is a necessary condition for warrant that does not
require any conscious activity on the part of the belief forming
agent. Further, quantitative consideration of the probability of
truth value reminds us of the objective 'weighing' of conse
quences associated with utilitarianism. The utilitarian agent acts
in such a way that maximizes happiness, with the probability
that this maximizai:ion will occur having been taken into consid
eration before the action is carried out. 5ince the maxim for the
reliabilist is truth (what would usually, be 'pleasure' or
'happiness' in a utilitarian theory of ethics), the end here is to
produce as much truth as possible. Truth is therefore rendered
calculable and the success of the agent's epistemic activity is
quantitatively considered.
When he introduces the notion of congenial cognitive
environment to complement the proper functioning of the agent's
belief-forming mechanism, Plantinga offers a short example:
II
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Your automobile might be in perfect working or
der, despite the fact that it will not run well at the
top of Pike's Peak, or under water, or on the moon.
We must therefore add another component to
warrant; your faculties must be in good working
order; and the environment must be appropriate
for your particular repertoire of epistemic power.
(7)
Now this example illustrates that an entity functioning properly
must be situated in an environment conducive to its activity if
that action is to actually take place properly. So it is evident here
that external factors can inhibit a properly functioning mecha
nism from realizing its proper ends. This point is self-evident and
not one to be challenged in itself. But its implications in the
context of Plantinga's theory are significant and ought to be paid
mind. I use an example of my own that involves an automobile to
show that there are internal considerations to be made that
Plantinga overlooks: An automobile that I am accustomed to
driving is functioning properly because all the mechanical parts
are working. I can count on the fact that the vehicle will noE
malfunction on its own accord. It is functioning properly, but
driving it one day, I make a mistake and crash into a telephone
pole. In this case I did not do my duty, or fulfill an obligation l'o
use the mechanism properly.l Now a reliabilist might say in reply
that my improper use of the vehicle might stem from some sort of
outside, inhibiting factor, even one much less extreme than
Plantinga's, that prevents me from using the mechanism prop
erly. In other words, the state of reliability was hindered from
without. In the case that my environment is conducive to proper
driving, however, there are clear internal considerations to be
made in this instance about the lack of fulfillment of my duties as
a driver. An evaluation of this matter from the viewpoint that an
external phenomenon must have c.aused me to crash the vehicle
would skirt the issue that there are duties and obligations that I
ought to fulfill in acting responsibly.
For Plantinga, there are scenarios in which the agent's
cognitive faculties function properly in a suitable environment
but cannot sufficiently provide for the warrant of beliefs. My
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criticisms cannot therefore stand to effectively challenge
Plantinga's theory of warrant unless I consider its third compo
nent, the design plan of an agent's cognitive mechanism. As is the
case for an organ or other biological entities and systems, cogni
tive faculties are said by Plantinga to have a particular design
plan that serves as a "blueprint" of their particular function (13).
He states, liThe purpose of the heart is to pump blood; that of our
cognitive faculties (overall) is to supply us with reliable informa
tion: about our environment, about the past, about the thoughts
and feelings of others, and so on" (14). Now Plantinga runs into a
problem here in trying to illustrate that the relationship between
our cognitive purpose and the relevant faculties is of a similar
nature to the purpose of such an organ as the heart and its
relation to the applicable biological system. A primary distinction
that Plantinga fails to draw is that the involuntary activity of the
heart contrasts with the voluntary cognitive faculties involved in
belief formation. Belief forming faculties, unlike the heart, require
a degree of volition internal to the agent; I could choose to not
form beliefs, or better true beliefs, in spite of the fact that the
relevant cognitive faculties are in good working order. Even if
my environment is suitable for such proper function, I can still
choose to not engage in forming beliefs. Further, the design plan
of the relevant segments of my cognitive faculties may be aimed
at h'uth with the objective probability, of true belief formation
being high, yet these faculties do not have to necessarily be used
accordingly.
Closely related to the voluntary nature of belief formation
is the idea that the relevant cognitive mechanisms are under a
certain amount of the agent's control. That is, belief formation
can be initiated through a decision on the part of the agent, and
further, carried out with accessibility to the mechanism that
ultimately justifies the belief. Presumably, proper function itself
is maintained insofar as phenomena like cognitive disorder or
external pressures do not corrupt the agent's belief forming
mechanism. These considerations, however, denote inhibiting
factors not in the believer's controL As in my automobile exam
ple, consideration of phenomena internal to the agent and within
her control is necessary in evaluating belief formation.
The notion of a design plan even further illustrates the
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state of unawareness and lack of control allowed in achieving
Plantingan warrant. If Plantinga posits that it is proper function
in accordance with the design plan that entails warrant, then
what conscious, controlled activities internal to the agent, if any,
contribute to the warrant of belief? Now concessions could be
made to Plantinga when we consider some of the necessary com
ponents that any reasonable epistemologist would have to take
into account when forming a theory of true belief. As most would
agree, our cognitive faculties have to be functioning properly, or
as they are supposed to, within a congenial environment for
sound epistemic judgments to be made. But even if Plantinga is
correct and such criteria are sufficient for warrant, then the idea
of warrant itself (when considering the above arguments) is still
insufficient in satisfying the requirements for producing true
beliefs. We then need to incorporate a strong component of
justification into a theory of belief formation, and I illustrate one
way in which this may be accomplished after showing that
Zagzebski's epistemic virtue theory collapses into a Plantingan
type of reliabilism.

n.
Linda Zagzebski raises an interesting criticism of reliabil
ism by suggesting that there is room for luck in its theories. With
an agent's belief-forming mechanism working reliably, relia
bilists can assume that luck, under normal circumstances, will
more times than not bring about true beliefs (Zagzebski 39). Now
this point illustrates the dangers of reliabilism well. With the
desire to seek truth should come the desire to avoid falsehood,
but the inheritance of the utilitarian lradition by reliabilists has
allowed them to go as far as to say that any epistemic means may
be used so long as more truth is produced than falsehood. From a
traditional internalist perspective and presumably from Zagzeb~
ski's standpoint, this lack of regulation on epistemic means is
unacceptable. The guessing agent is not fulfilling his duty to form
beliefs responsibly, while at the same time, the intellectual habit
of guessing is certainly an epistemic vice. I demonstrate below
how vicious epistemic means like guessing could still be em
ployed within a virtue theory like Zagzebski's, thereby helping
me make the case that epistemic virtue can only contribute to a

11

12

Peter J. Tedesco
theory of belief formation if strong deontic concepts, like duty,
are mandated for justification to exist.
Zagzebski argues "that a virtue-based epistemology is
well suited to analyze the traditional concepts of epistemology,
namely, justification and knowledge" (11). For this virtue theo
rist, the concept of epistemic virtue is not evaluated by identify
ing whether a belief is formed properly, nor if an agent is
disposed to believing correctly. Further, a virtue is not just a
disposition to act in the 'right' way because virtuous action may
not correspond to act-based, normative criteria (Zagzebski 15-6).
The believer, from the perspective of theories based on act-based
criteria, is not necessarily 'right' to the fullest extent, but simply
'not wrong.' Zagzebski emphasizes that, in a theory of epistemic
virtue, 'right' does not simply mean 'not wrong.' She looks to
virtue ethics to explain this point:
The focus of this type of ethics is on avoiding
blameworthiness rather than on achieving moral
praiseworthiness. Virtue ethics, in contrast, allows
for a greater range of evaluative levels and gives
due regard to the fact that our moral aim is not
only to avoid the bottom level of the moral scale
but to end up as high on the scale as possible. (28)
Zagzebski claims that her interpretation of deontic concepts is
broad enough to correspond to almost any virtue theory (232).
She states the following about the different types of virtue theo
ries:
According to a merely agent-focused theory, the
behavior of virtuous persons does not make an act
right but is simply the best way to determine
rightness, whereas a pure virtue theory treats the
rightness of an act as strictly dependent upon
virtue. In a pure virtue theory, an act is right
because it is the sort of act a virtuous person might
do, whereas in an agent-focused theory, what is
done by a virtuous person is just the best criterion
of rightness. (232)
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Although she admits that her theory reads in such a way that her
ideas may, at times, correspond most easily to pure virtue theo
ries, Zagzebski nevertheless asserts that her first series of deontic
definitions does not take internal states of the agent" into con
sideration (235).
For Zagzebski, a virtue approach to epistemology ex
pands the realm of both praise and reproach in passing judg
ments on a belief and the way in which it is formed. In other
words, the judgments of permissibility (the formation of a belief
that renders the agent simply wrong or not wrong) that charac
terize epistemic evaluation in the act-based tradition are not the
only evaluative criteria used in her virtue-based model. The
agent's state of being right can extend beyond his just having
done what is permissible-he can act in a praiseworthy manner
(Zagzebski 233). She describes one way to characterize virtuous
behavior:
/I

A virtuous person's behavior arises out of virtuous
motives and is reliably successful in achieving
virtuous ends. What makes the virtuous person
reliably successful in addition to her motive is her
understanding of the rnoral and nonmoral facts
about the situations she encounters. The level of
understanding a virtuous person has, then, is
whatever is sufficient to make her reliably success
ful in producing the ends of virtue. (234)
So, virtuous motivation leading to the reliable production of
virtuous ends is essentially her take on the requirements of
epistemic success. There are clearly aspects of this account that
are both internalist and reliabilist in the sense that the motiva
tional factors are internal and the reliable production of ends are
reminiscent of Plantinga's reliabilist theory. The difference be
tween this aspect of ZagzebsHs theory and Plantingafs reliabil
ism is that the nature of the believer's motivation is necessarily
virtuous and the end to be produced is virtuous as well. But the
theory is still characteristically reliabilist in the sense that the
epistemic goal is to produce true beliefs.
Virtuous motivation is not enough to constitute a suffi
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dent internal aspect of this theory. I do not have to have cogni
tive access to my belief-forming mechanism in order to be moti
vated in such a way that Zagzebski describes. All that her inter
2
nalist feature does is add value to the epistemic end. I am
motivated to produce this end, virtuously perhaps, but neverthe
less there is no check on my belief forming process other than
that it is directed toward virtue. Therefore, insofar as I seek to
produce virtuous ends, with a reliable mechanism to produce
such ends, I can achieve epistemic success. Clearly then, Zagzeb
ski inherits aspects of the utilitarian model that are intrinsic to
reliabilist theories like Plantinga's. Planting a concentrates little, if
not at all, on stipulating the proper means by which true beliefs
may be formed. The reliability of belief-forming mechanisms is a
necessary condition under which beliefs may be warranted but
not the means by which we may come to believe and be justified.
So Zagzebski, if she is to separate herself from Plantinga at all,
must make the case that a virtuously motivated agent who directs
himself toward a virtuous end actually forms the belief virtu
ously. However, cannot I be motivated in a certain way but not
act in a way properly reflecting the nature of that motivation? In
other words, can I use means that are characteristic of epistemic
viciousness like guessing? If I can, then this component of
Zagzebski's virtue theory collapses into a reliabilist model; I
could act to produce an end without any definitive internal
consideration of how I am to attain such an end.
If we concentrate on Zagzebski's treatment of justifica
tion, the dominating presence of reliabilism in her theory is made
even more evident. She states, A justified belief is what a person
who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who has the under
standing of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have,
might believe in like circumstances" (241). Key to our discussion
is how we interpret what constitutes, for Zagzebski, an agent's
"understanding of his cognitive situation." Now, if we refer to
her description (which I cited earlier) of that which constitutes
virtuous behavior, then this "understanding" implies an aware
ness of the moral and non-moral facts of a particular situation.
An awareness of such facts, however, does not necessarily sug
gest a state of cognitive accessibility to the grounds that justify
my belief because my cognitive situation, despite my awareness
1/
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of relevant facts, may be one in which I am uncertain of which
relevant facts lead to cognitive certainty.
Zagzebski grants that her theory can be interpreted as
having stTonger externalist tendencies than she herself attributes
to it, for her concept of virtuous motivation could be changed to
the extent that the internal component of the theory bears less
significance. At the same time, she sees the theory as adaptable to
an internalist framework if the production of virtuous ends is
eliminated from the criterion of epistemic success and attention is
given solely to motivational factors in defining intellectual
virtue.3 The modifications suggested here to tailor the theory
toward internalism are not suitable, and the concessions to exter
nalism unnecessary, given the already prominent reliabilist fea
tures of the theory. The internal motivational factors stipulated
by Zagzebski need not be lessened for her theory to retain its
great reliabilist appeaL
As mentioned previously, even if I have virtuous motiva
tions directed toward virtuous ends and I deem my cognitive
mechanisms to be reliable, I may still use vicious or irresponsible
means in order to produce such ends. As long as my primary goal
is to produce ends, independent of the nature of these ends, I can
use means unbecoming a virtuous agent. To use an example, let
us say I have decided to go to a lecture given by a famous
professor on Aristotle's theory of friendship. I drive to the lecture
in the same reliable automobile mentioned in the earlier example.
I am motivated to get to the lecture because I have this desire to
understand Aristotle. Virtuously motivated to learn, I keep driv
ing, only to realize that I am lost after coming to a stop sign. Not
knowing whether I must turn right or left to find my destination,
I randomly guess. Here, independent of whether I guessed cor
rectly, I did not use virtuous means to attain a virtuous end. The
use of a vicious epistemic means in this example, guessing, could
have stemmed from a number of factors, but there is no basis for
its permissibility. Further, I could have an awareness of the facts
about the situation that I have encountered, an awareness that is
one of the components that characterizes virtuous behavior for
Zagzebski, while still failing to use virtuous means in resolving
the situation. For instance, I know that during some point in my
trip I became lost. Also, I am aware of my destination and the
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reasons for my wanting to reach that destination. These are the
facts surrounding the situation that I encounter, and my guessing
which way I ought to turn is a means not in accord with the
virtuous nature of both my motivation and goaL
Zagzebski's understanding of the role that virtue plays in
belief formation is not compatible with a strong internalism. She
states, "Although I have rejected purely externalist accounts of
knowledge, I have also argued that a weaker form of externalism
is right since 'virtue' is a success term" (333). If virtue is such a
kind of term, and strong virtuous motivations are to be the
primary, if not the only internal criteria in her theory, then it
would seem that our virtuous motivations still stem from a desire
to produce virtuous ends. Since Zagzebski thinks weaker exter
nal theories are right because of their understanding of virtue,
then the sort of term 'virtue' is in the context of belief formation
would have to change if we have strong internalist convictions.
We are now faced with the questions about the terms of
virtue. Early in Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski states:
The mark of a virtue theory of morality is that the
primary object of evaluation is persons or inner
traits of persons rather than acts. To describe a
good person is to describe that person's virtues,
and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible
neither to the performance of acts independently
identified as right nor to a disposition to perform
such acts. There is both more and less to a moral
virtue than a disposition to act in the right way.
There is more because a virtue also includes being
disposed to have characteristic emotions, desires,
motives, and attitudes. There is less because a
virtuous person does not invariably act in a way
that can be fully captured by any set of indepen
dent normative criteria. (15-6)
Despite Zagzebski's claims that virtue theory often denotes inner
characteristics of the agent that are out of the scope of normative
criteria, I believe that the chief characteristic of virtue is that it
disposes the individual to ultimately act in a good way. Now
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virtue theory may require degrees of evaluation both above and
below rightness, but an action-promoting disposition aids the
individual, initially, to act in such a way that is 'right.' If
Zagzebski is correct in saying that from an act-based perspective,
'right' means simply 'not wrong,' then virtue can initially dispose
us to do just that-what is 'not wrong.' The virtuous agent is
expected to go beyond obligation (beyond what is 'not wrong'),
but can still be disposed toward action by the virtue even if that
action cannot be deemed praiseworthy, or something else beyond
'not wrong.' The higher degrees of meritorious action are cer
tainly characteristic of virtuous disposition, but every good act of
any degree is, at bottom, 'not wrong.' This condition of being
'not wrong' is indeed a state of rightness, one that is ensured in
belief formation by the minimum, deontic criteria of internal
justification. Beyond these basic requirements for justification, it
is the primary function of epistemic virtue to dispose us toward
goodness in forming and holding true beliefs.
III.
A concept of epistemic virtue can complement traditional
internalism to form a theory that takes into account a sufficient
component of deontic concepts. At I:he au tseL, we sl10lild under
stand justification as a term of rightness and virtue as a term of
goodness. As in ethics, the right and the good should serve
different functions here. An action is right if, at minimum, it
meets the requirements of permissibility, thereby not violating
any duty or obligation. In its negative sense, rightness therefore
fundamentally designates that an action is 'not wrong.' Actions
that exceed obligation or go beyond the call of duty are not only
right, but can also be evaluated in terms of their goodness. Now,
on the nature of the relationship between the good and the right,
we can say that the right is necessary for the promotion of the
good in the sense that it provides a foundation upon, or (I
framework within which the good is cultivated. It is with this
relationship in mind that I outline how internal justification and
a concept of epistemic virtue may be unified.
First, in forming true beliefs, an agent must have an
awareness of the cognitive mechanisms that he uses to justify his
beliefs. The process is then sufficiently under the agent's control
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when in having this awareness, he reflects on that which is
cognitively accessible to him. If a belief is formed in such a state
of cognitive control, then the agent is epistemically dutiful in that
he has met the minimum requirements of justifying his belief.
Being internally justified in such a way, the agent is 'right.'
Second, the agent may be disposed toward good (we could use a
variety of terms here that designate degrees of goodness) belief
formation by epistemic virtue, therefore having gone beyond the
call of duty.
Virtue is both an epistemic aid and reward, for it con
tributes to, and is cultivated by good belief formation. Since the
minimum requirements for internal justification are purely deon
tic here, however, epistemic virtue need not be a necessary factor
in fulfilling such requirements. There are, of course, varying
degrees of goodness that the virtuous person may be disposed
toward in action. The same degrees of goodness apply to belief
formation as well, but our epistemic standards should first and
foremost establish what entails rightness in the belief forming
process. 4
Notes
I thank Stan Yeung for those late night discussions in which we strug
fled with this example.
Please see Zagzebski, p. 313.
3 Please see Zagzebski, p. 330. She has Plantinga's theory of proper
function in mind here.
4 I thank Gavin Colvert for his undying guidance and the revisions he
made on earlier drafts of this paper.
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